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Colour Processing in Adversarial Attacks on Face Liveness Systems
L. Abduh and I. Ivrissimtzis
Durham University, Department of Computer Science, UK
Abstract
In the context of face recognition systems, liveness test is a binary classification task aiming at distinguishing between input
images that come from real people’s faces and input images that come from photos or videos of those faces, and presented to
the system’s camera by an attacker. In this paper, we train the state-of-the-art, general purpose deep neural network ResNet for
liveness testing, and measure the effect on its performance of adversarial attacks based on the manipulation of the saturation
component of the imposter images. Our findings suggest that higher saturation values in the imposter images lead to a decrease
in the network’s performance. Next, we study the relationship between the proposed adversarial attacks and corresponding
direct presentation attacks. Initial results on a small dataset of processed images which are then printed on paper or displayed
on an LCD or a mobile phone screen, show that higher saturation values lead to higher values in the network’s loss function,
indicating that these colour manipulation techniques can indeed be converted into enhanced presentation attacks.
CCS Concepts
• Computing methodologies → Computer vision tasks; Image manipulation;
1. Introduction
Face recognition [ZCPR03] has long been established as the bio-
metric method of choice for everyday applications, such as a mo-
bile phone or PC login. However, its use in security critical appli-
cations is currently restricted to controlled environments, such as
airport passport control, but not, for example, money withdrawal
from street ATM machines.
The main reason behind this limitation is that face recognition
is considered particularly vulnerable to presentation attacks, where
one may gain access by presenting in front of the system’s camera
a photo or a video of the user they impersonate [GMF14]. Devel-
oped as countermeasures to such attacks, liveness tests are binary
classifiers aiming at distinguishing between the genuine client and
illegitimate imposter images or videos.
In this paper, we study adversarial attacks on liveness tests based
on deep neural networks. In particular, we study the extent to which
increasing the saturation of an imposter face image degrades the
ability of the neural network to classify it correctly. Our approach
was motivated by the observation that, generally, the client images
have more vivid colours than the imposter ones.
We note that the study of adversarial attacks on machine learn-
ing classifiers is the focus of a large body of recent research and is
considered one of the main methodologies for understanding and
improving neural network performance. However, while deep neu-
ral networks are establishing themselves as the state-of-the-art in
almost every classification task, to the best of our knowledge ad-
versarial attacks on liveness tests have not been studied, with the
exception of [OI16b,OI16a], where however adversarial attacks on
traditional only machine learning methods are studied.
In the context of classifiers for liveness tests, beyond the issue
of understanding and improving the classifier, another question we
want to address is whether the proposed adversarial attack can be
converted into a direct presentation attack. That is, we want to ver-
ify that the same performance degradation will be observed if in-
stead of just manipulating the imposter images of the database, we
create new imposter images by increasing the saturation of client
images, printing them or displaying them on an electronic device
and capture an image of them. In other words, we would like to
verify that the all-digital adversarial attack on the test database of
the classifier can be converted into a physical attack on a real live-
ness test system.
As the execution of that physical attack is a labour intensive pro-
cess, we run a very limited experiment, which however gives a clear
indication that the corresponding presentation attack is enhanced
by the manipulation of the client images before presenting them to
the system’s camera. This was not an unexpected result, since we
had already established that saturation increases lead to classifier
performance degradation, and we naturally expect that by present-
ing to the camera a higher saturation image it will also result into a
higher saturation image as the camera’s output.
Contributions: We propose a colour manipulation adversarial at-
tack to a face liveness system based on a deep neural network. To
the best of our knowledge, it is the first study of adversarial attacks
on deep neural networks in the context of face liveness detection.
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In a second contribution, we conducted an experiment the result
of which indicate that the proposed adversarial attack can be con-
verted into a direct presentation attack.
Limitations: Due to the laboriousness of the task of creating a
database with enhanced presentation attacks, the experiment cor-
responding to the second contribution was limited in scope and the
creation of a sizeable database with enhanced presentation attacks
is left as future work.
2. Related work
2.1. Liveness detection
Varghese and Matthew [VM15] classified liveness detection meth-
ods into intrusive and non-intrusive types, depending on their inter-
ference with the biometric data acquisition process. Alternatively,
depending on the way the classification algorithm handles image
features, liveness detection methods can be categorised into: tradi-
tional face anti-spoofing methods using hand-designed features and
employing shallow machine learning, and deep learning methods.
Regarding traditional methods, Boulkenafet, at el. [BKH15] ex-
tracted local binary patterns (LBP) features from individual im-
age channels in various colour spaces (RGB, HSV, YCbCr) and
test on the CASIA database and Replay-Attack databases. LBPs
are the most commonly used image feature for liveness detection,
e.g. [CAM12a] used LBPs and shallow learning on three types of
attacks: printed photographs, digital photos and videos. In addition,
using several colour spaces such as RGB, HSV and YCbCr leads
to more effective liveness detection algorithms [JXMA19].
Recent research has shown that in liveness detection tasks, deep
learning methods could be more effective than those based on hand-
crafted features. The limitations of the latter become more appar-
ent in a diversity of sensing environments; while they perform rea-
sonably well within intra-dataset protocols, they are less suitable
within multi-domain datasets as they cannot be easily adapted to
new circumstances [BCV13]. Instead, the extraction of high-level
(deep) features from a dataset, especially in systems that work on
complex tasks, need multi-layered methods [WHJ15]. Convolu-
tional Neural Networks (CNNs) in particular can achieve impres-
sive results on image and video classification tasks.
One of the earliest attempts on liveness detection with CNNs
is Yang et al. [YLL14], the results of which were improved by
Atoum et al. [ALJL17] using a two-stream CNN-based face anti-
spoofing method; the first stream extracts local and holistic features
and the second is used to estimate a dense depth map. Their model
achieved good performance in the intra-testing stage. Nagpal and
Dubey [ND18] evaluated liveness detection algorithms on the In-
ception and ResNet architectures over the MSU database [PHJ16],
covering several aspects of the architectures such as depth of the
model, learning rate and random weight initialisation.
2.2. Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial attacks can be very simple in nature. In [NK16], the
authors generated attacks by adding a small perturbation to a single
pixel, or a small set of pixels. We also note that there are several
open-source software tools for generating adversarial images, e.g.
DeepFool [MDFF16]. However, in our context, the most relevant
adversarial attacks are the black-box ones, where the attacker does
not have access to the hidden layers of the network or more gen-
erally any information about the type and the parameters of the
classification algorithm.
3. Experimental setup
The liveness detection classifier we use is based on ResNet, the
winner of the classification task in the 2015 ImageNet Large-
Scale Visual Recognition Challenge [RDS∗15], reaching a 3.57
% error. Specifically, we used the ResNet50 variant, consisting
of 50 layers. For training and testing, we used the Replay-Attack
database [CAM12b]. While there are several other databases that
are routinely used in liveness detection research, such as CASIA
[ZYL∗12] and NUAA [TLLJ10], we chose Replay-Attack which
supports more types of presentation attacks: printed photos; video
and photo playback on an iPhone; photos and videos displayed on
an iPad screen.
3.1. Implementation and training
All code was written in Python, on the Pytorch deep learning plat-
form, and the experiments ran on an Intel Core i7 CPU 64GB RAM
PC. We used the pre-trained convolutional part of ResNet50 and
trained with our images for 24 epochs, using the Adam optimizer
with learning rate 0.0001, while the batch size was set to 20. The
custom classifier contains a fully connected layer with ReLU ac-
tivation and followed by a Dropout with 20% chance of dropping
and a fully connected layer with log softmax output.
3.2. Validation
Using a within-subject validation protocol, we trained ResNet50
with 1279 images from 14 subjects. The test set consisted of 290
client and 310 imposter images, from all 14 subjects. On the clients,
we obtained a True Negative Rate (TNR) of 99%, while on im-
posters a True Positive Rate (TPR) of 98% for a total accuracy rate
of 98%.
The impressive performance of ResNet50 under a within-subject
protocol masks the difficulty of the liveness classification task on
images of previously unseen faces. In a next step, we validated the
network under a cross-subject protocol, training ResNet50 on 1082
images from 12 subjects and testing it on 240 images (120 clients
and 120 imposters) from 2 different subjects. This time we obtained
a TPR of 88% and a TNR of 53% for a total accuracy rate of 70%.
Indicative of the nature of the challenges in cross-subject liveness
detection, we note that the very low TNR was almost exclusively
due to very poor performance on one of the two subjects for which
almost all client images were misclassified as imposters.
4. Results
4.1. Adversarial Attack
The adversarial attack was validated with the cross-subject valida-
tion protocol described in Section 3. After the images were con-
verted to the HSV colour space, in a first experiment the saturation
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α 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75
Tp 95 89 99 89 88 75 75 77
L .21 .33 .06 .27 .38 .57 .56 .53
Table 1: TPR Tp and average loss L for various values of α. The
grey shaded column corresponds to the original images.
s 31 63 95 127 159 191 223 255
L .20 .17 .15 .48 .77 .82 .98 .68
Tp 92 94 91 80 70 58 55 73
Table 2: TPR Tp and loss L for various fixed values of s.
value s was multiplied by a constant α and capped to 255. That is:
s→min{α · s , 255}.
Figure 1 shows one imposter image from each subject undergoing
that type of colour manipulation. Table 1 shows the obtained TPRs
and the average loss. The main observation is that when α > 1 the
TPR is lower than that on the original images, which correspond
to α = 1, indicating a successfully adversarial attack. In contrast,
when α < 1, the TPR is higher, providing further evidence for the
effectiveness of the attack. As expected, the average loss values
exhibit the opposite pattern.So, we note the significant decrease in
the TPR, which, for example, translates into 12% more imposter
attacks being successful when the saturation value is multiplied by
1.25.Note that as we do not manipulate the client images, the TNR
is the same as in Section 3.
In a second experiment, we put the saturation of all pixels of all
images to a fixed value s. The corresponding example images are
shown in Figure 2 and the corresponding TPR and average loss val-
ues are shown in Table 4.1. We notice that in the range 63-233 the
TPR drops monotonically as the saturation increases, starting from
a value as high as 94% for s = 63 and dropping to a low of 55% for
s = 223. The extreme values of s = 31 at the left end of the table
and s = 255 at the right end of the table exhibit different behaviour,
in an interesting phenomenon that in the future we would like to
study further.
4.2. Presentation Attack
The presentation attack was validated on imposter images created
from the client images of the Replay-Attack. Three client images
from each of the two subjects were:
i. printed on A4 paper
ii. displayed on a commodity laptop LCD screen
iii.displayed on an iPhone screen
and then captured with an iPhone camera. The acquired images
were manually cropped and resized to 60×60. The whole process
was repeated with the saturation of the client images put at a fixed
value of 180. Figures 3-5 show one face image for each subject and
each condition.
The corresponding TPR and loss are reported in Table 3. We note
Original Processed
paper 100 (0.05) 83 (0.46)
LCD 100 (0.03) 100 (0.07)
mobile 100 (0.18) 66 (0.42)
Table 3: TPR and (loss) for all 6 types of presentation attacks.
that, as expected, in all three forms of physical attacks, a high sat-
uration value of s = 180 leads to a lower or equal TPR when com-
pared to the corresponding imposter images that were produced by
the same physical method from unprocessed client images. We note
that while the test set is very small for the reported TPR to have sig-
nificance, the reported loss values provide further evidence for the
validity of the conclusions.
5. Conclusions
Our experiments demonstrated that the simple and intuitive adver-
sarial attack of increasing the value of the saturation component of
an image can be effective against neural network based face live-
ness systems. Initial results indicate that this adversarial attack can
become the basis for an effective presentation attack, in which the
imposter increases the saturation of a face image before printing it
on paper or displaying on the screen of an electronic device.
In the future, we plan to create a database with imposter images
corresponding to this type of presentation attack.
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